Strategic Delegation: An Experiment.
We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his share increases. Since in such a case the proposer does not use the delegate as a commitment device, this effect identifies an additional explanation of the delegation phenomenon. This result holds when delegation is mandatory or optional. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces his share as his delegate is perceived to be more willing to accept tough offers. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Fershtman, Chaim ; Gneezy, Uri |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 32.2001, 2, p. 352-68
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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