Strategic delegation and collusion: Do incentive schemes matter?

This paper introduces delegation decisions and contracts based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) in the analysis of cartel stability. We follow the approach developed by Lambertini and Trombetta [12], where manager's compensation combines pro_ts and sales (CPS) instead. Some of our results are similar while others are distinct from those of Lambertini and Trombetta. In particular, we show that collusion under RPE is always harder to sustain than under CPS.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Guigou, Jean-Daniel ; Lamirande, Patrick De ; Lovat, Bruno
Institutions:	Luxembourg School of Finance, Faculté de droit, d'économie et de finance
Subject:	Cartel Stability \| Delegation \| Relative Performance Evaluation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	LSF Research Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009023965