Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms

By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semipublic firm) and that all the firms are equally efficient, then in equilibrium both firms hire managers.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Barcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 30.2010, 1, p. 744-750
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Mixed duopoly \| Semipublic Firms \| Managerial incentive contracts \| Cournot competition

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562390