Strategic Delegation by Unobservable Incentive Contracts
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Koçkesen, Levent ; Ok, Efe A. |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2002 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.308766 [DOI] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
Gerratana, Emanuele, (2013)
-
Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji, (2011)
-
Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy
Furusawa, Taiji, (2011)
- More ...
-
Negatively interdependent preferences
Ok, Efe A., (1997)
-
Popular support for progressive taxation in the presence of interdependent preferences
Mitra, Tapan, (1997)
-
Strategic delegation by unobservable incentive contracts
Koçkesen, Levent, (2004)
- More ...