Strategic delegation when public inputs for a global good are imperfect substitutes
Year of publication: |
February 2017
|
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Authors: | Nishimura, Yukihiro ; Terai, Kimiko |
Published in: |
International tax and public finance. - New York : Springer, ISSN 0927-5940, ZDB-ID 1207421-4. - Vol. 24.2017, 1, p. 96-111
|
Subject: | Environmental policy | Transnational externalities | Strategic delegation | Complementarity | Umweltpolitik | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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