Strategic divide and choose
We consider the classic cake-division problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and efficient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multi-step sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Nicolò, Antonio ; Yu, Yan |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 64.2008, 1, p. 268-289
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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