Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences
Year of publication: |
2010-08-12
|
---|---|
Authors: | Grossman, Zachary |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, University of California-Santa Barbara (UCSB) |
Subject: | social preferences | strategic ignorance | moral wiggle-room | default effects | status quo bias | self- deception | self-signaling | dictator games | Social and Behavioral Sciences | Other Economics |
-
Strategic ignorance and the robustness of social preferences
Grossman, Zachary, (2014)
-
Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas
Grossman, Zachary, (2013)
-
Dijk, Wilco W. van, (2020)
- More ...
-
Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in Giving
Grossman, Zachary, (2010)
-
An Unlucky Feeling: Persistent Overestimation of Absolute Performance with Noisy Feedback
Grossman, Zachary, (2011)
-
Delegating to a Powerless Intermediary: Does It Reduce Punishment?
Grossman, Zachary, (2011)
- More ...