Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device.
We analyse the decision of an agent with time-inconsistent preferences to consume a good that exerts an externality on future welfare. The extent of the externality is initially unknown, but may be learned via a costless sampling procedure. We show that when the agent cannot commit to future consumption and learning decisions, incomplete learning may occur on a Markov perfect equilibrium path of the resulting intrapersonal game. In such a case, each agent's incarnation stops learning for some values of the posterior distribution of beliefs and acts under self-restricted information. This conduct is interpreted as strategic ignorance. All equilibria featuring this property strictly Pareto dominate the complete learning equilibrium for any posterior distribution of beliefs. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Carrillo, Juan D ; Mariotti, Thomas |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 67.2000, 3, p. 529-44
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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