Strategic inattention, delegation and endogenous market structure
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P. |
Published in: |
European economic review : EER. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-2921, ZDB-ID 207969-0. - Vol. 121.2020, p. 1-10
|
Subject: | Delegation | Information | Monopolistic competition | Oligopoly | Strategic interaction | Oligopol | Marktstruktur | Market structure | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Monopolistischer Wettbewerb | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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