Strategic information exchange
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Rosenberg, Dinah ; Solan, Eilon ; Vieille, Nicolas |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 82.2013, p. 444-467
|
Subject: | Repeated games | Incomplete information on both sides | Information externalities | Folk Theorem | Equilibrium | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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