Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Bhattacharya, Sourav ; Mukherjee, Arijit |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - RAND, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 44.2013, 3, p. 522-544
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Publisher: |
RAND |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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