Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Terzopoulou, Zoi ; Endriss, Ulle |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1573-7187, ZDB-ID 1478916-4. - Vol. 92.2022, 2, p. 363-385
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Subject: | Social choice theory | Judgment aggregation | Voting | Manipulation | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Aggregation | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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