Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Benoît, Jean-Pierre |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 102.2002, 2, p. 421-436
|
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Glücksspiel | Gambling | Wahl | Election | Theorie | Theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty |
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