Strategic Network Interdiction

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, the agency chooses a blockage, which specifies a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. However, the blockage of arcs disrupts the operation of the network. The adversary gains and the agency loses from the target damage and the network disruption. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. We characterize the Nash equilibria in terms of the primitives of our model. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel type mode of a (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.