Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 87.2014, p. 485-496
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Subject: | Endogenous information | Disclosure | Signal quality | Transparency | Specific investment | Strategic ignorance | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Investition | Investment | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Signalling |
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