Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
Year of publication: |
October 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Peeters, Ronald ; Saran, Rene ; Yüksel, Ayşe Müge |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 47.2016, 3, p. 729-759
|
Subject: | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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