Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure.
We introduce intermediaries into the Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade policy. A key finding is that in regimes involving independent retailers, output competition and linear pricing (and two-part tariffs under certain restrictions), the optimal policy involves an export tax instead of a subsidy. If firms commit to vertical structure before governments commit to policy then under output competition firms choose integration, whereas if policy precedes structure then at least one firm chooses separation. Under price competition separation is a dominant strategy regardless of whether the structure decision is made before or after the policy decision. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Ziss, Steffen |
Published in: |
Review of International Economics. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0965-7576. - Vol. 5.1997, 1, p. 142-52
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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