Strategic transmission of imperfect information : why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
Year of publication: |
2023
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Authors: | Förster, Manuel |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 52.2023, 4, p. 1291-1316
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Subject: | Certification | Cheap talk | Imperfect information | Soft evidence | Strategic communication | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Kommunikation | Communication | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Strategisches Management | Strategic management | Interne Kommunikation | Internal communication |
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