Strategic Voting Under the Qualified Majority Rule
This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duvergers Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of popular support. When private signals are the main source of information, the uniquely stable equilibrium entails only limited strategic voting and hence partial coordination. This is due to the surprising presence of negative feedback: An increase in strategic voting by others reduces the incentive for a rational voter to act strategically. The theory leads to the conclusion that multi-candidate support in a plurality electoral system is perfectly consistent with rational voting behaviour.
Year of publication: |
2000-02-01
|
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Authors: | Myatt, David P. |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Oxford University |
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