Extent: | xv, 491 Seiten Diagramme |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Bibliografie ; Lehrbuch ; Textbook |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Includes bibliographical references and index PrefaceIntroduction -- Representations and basic assumptions -- The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Analyzing behavior in static settings -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location, partnership, and social unrest -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Analyzing behavior in dynamic settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Sequential rationality and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Information -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation -- Appendices -- Index. |
ISBN: | 978-0-393-91838-0 ; 978-0-393-92082-6 |
Classification: | Wissenschaftstheorie ; Methoden und Techniken der Volkswirtschaft ; Mikroökonomie |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193003