Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but may treat individuals asymmetrically.
Year of publication: |
1995-09
|
---|---|
Authors: | Barbera, Salvador |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance
Barbera, Salvador, (1976)
-
Barbera, Salvador, (1993)
-
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods
Barbera, Salvador, (1991)
- More ...