Strategy-Proof and Fair Assignment is Wasteful

I prove that there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. This strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening their assumption of ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an open question posed by Erdil (2014) and sheds some light on his results on the efficient frontier of random assignment mechanisms

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Martini, Giorgio
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Gerechtigkeit \| Justice \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Allokationseffizienz \| Allocative efficiency \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Güter \| Goods \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 6, 2015 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2615389 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021494