Strategy-proof and symmetric social choice functions for public good economies
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Serizawa, Shigehiro |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an internat. society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 67.1999, 1, p. 121-145
|
Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Theorie | Theory |
-
Inequality aversion and coalition formation
McEvoy, David M., (2016)
-
Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda
Meya, Johannes, (2017)
-
Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda
Meya, Johannes, (2017)
- More ...
-
Serizawa, Shigehiro, (2015)
-
A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
Morimoto, Shuhei, (2013)
-
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Hatsumi, Kentaro, (2011)
- More ...