STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | DIETRICH, FRANZ ; LIST, CHRISTIAN |
Published in: |
Economics and Philosophy. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 23.2007, 03, p. 269-300
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
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