Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
Year of publication: |
April 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hashimoto, Kazuhiko ; Saitoh, Hiroki |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 46.2016, 4, p. 749-766
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Allokation | Allocation | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design |
-
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix, (2015)
-
Assigning an unpleasant task without payment
Goldlücke, Susanne, (2018)
-
"Dynamic allocation without money"
Guo, Yingni, (2020)
- More ...
-
Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko, (2015)
-
Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko, (2012)
-
Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: Improvement of the Supremal Welfare Loss
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko, (2010)
- More ...