Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over $A$.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Reffgen, Alexander ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 7.2012, 3, p. 663-688
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Multiple public goods \| strategy-proofness \| voting under constraints \| additive preferences \| separable preferences

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE909 [DOI] 894577956 [GVK] hdl:10419/150182 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:909 [RePEc]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599473