Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Berga Colom, Dolors |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 35.1998, 2, p. 105-120
|
Subject: | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Theorie | Theory |
-
No-envy and Arrow`s conditions
Denicolò, Vincenzo, (1999)
-
Aggregation of smooth preferences
Schofield, Norman, (1998)
-
Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates
Bhadury, Joyendu, (1998)
- More ...
-
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
Berga Colom, Dolors, (2000)
-
Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
Berga Colom, Dolors, (1996)
-
Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
Berga Colom, Dolors, (1996)
- More ...