Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities.
We show that, in markets with indivisibilties (typified by the Shapley-Scarf housing market), the strict core mechanism is categorically determined by three assumptions: individual rationality, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Ma, Jinpeng |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 23.1994, 1, p. 75-83
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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