Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this paper, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences. Copyright 2008 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | WEYMARK, JOHN A. |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 10.2008, 1, p. 7-26
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
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