Strategy-proofness of stochastic assignment mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Schmelzer, André |
Publisher: |
Bonn : Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
Subject: | market design | mechanism design | randomization |
-
Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms
Schmelzer, André, (2016)
-
Strategy-proofness of stochastic assignment mechanisms
Schmelzer, André, (2017)
-
Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms
Schmelzer, André, (2017)
- More ...
-
Committing the English and the continental way: An experiment
Engel, Christoph, (2017)
-
Beyond information: Disclosure, distracted attention, and investor behavior / Adrian Hillenbrand
Hillenbrand, Adrian, (2015)
-
Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms
Schmelzer, André, (2016)
- More ...