Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite‐player games
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite‐player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non‐atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite‐player games.
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Carmona, Guilherme ; Podczeck, Konrad |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - The Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 16.2021, 3, p. 1055-1093
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Publisher: |
The Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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