Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Escudé, Matteo ; Sinander, Ludvig |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 107.2020, p. 13-16
|
Subject: | Auction | Dominant strategy | Mechanism design | Robustness | Strategy-proof | Virtual | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Allokation | Allocation |
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