Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents
Year of publication: |
September 1989
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Authors: | Fernandez, Raquel |
Other Persons: | Glazer, Jacob (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes | Collective bargaining theory |
Description of contents: |
This paper models the wage-contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the union
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Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w3108 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Mode of access: World Wide Web Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w3108 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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