Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
Murat R. Sertel; M. Remzi Sanver
| Year of publication: |
2004
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Sertel, Murat R. ; Sanver, M. Remzi |
| Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 22.2004, 2, p. 331-347
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| Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001968973