Structural Reforms and Legislative Immobilism : The Fox Sexenio

The Mexican Congress failed to pass structural reforms during the administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006). This was the case despite evidence of an otherwise productive legislature. This paper contributes to the literature seeking to explain the failure to enact such reforms during this period. A bi-dimensional issue environment is found to be an important explanation for this case of immobilism. While this argument is not novel, its application to Mexico's multiparty legislature with moderately high levels of party unity necessitates an analysis of coalition formation appropriate to Mexico's institutional and political arrangements. Statistical analysis of roll-call data is utilized. The only floor-vote in the Chamber of Deputies during the Fox Sexenio (six-year presidential term) that proposed real structural reform is discussed in light of its bi-dimensional characteristics. Interviews with legislators are also utilized to support the bi-dimensional argument. The results of this study contribute both to explaining the failure of structural reforms in Mexico during the Fox Sexenio and to the broader comparative debate on the relative influences of social-structural, agential and institutional factors on policy outcomes. The findings highlight the importance of intra-chamber political conditions and skillful leadership for decisive legislative action. The paper concludes with a discussion of the Calderón administration's somewhat more successful efforts in working with Congress to enact structural reforms