Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt; The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime

In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.

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Year of publication:	2007-08-01
Authors:	Bolton, Patrick ; Jeanne, Olivier
Institutions:	International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Subject:	Sovereign debt \| Debt restructuring \| Bankruptcy \| debt structure \| sovereign debt restructuring \| debt renegotiations \| debt crisis \| repayments \| debt crises \| sovereign debt crisis \| sovereign bond \| debt structures \| financial crises \| short-term debt \| sovereign debt crises \| sovereign defaults \| debt obligations \| sovereign borrowers \| debt exchange \| international debt \| private debt \| debt maturity \| debt market \| domestic debt \| resource allocation \| financial distress \| debt defaults \| debt contracts \| bad debt \| repurchases \| sovereign bonds \| debt default \| international financial crises

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IMF Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series IMF Working Papers Number 07/192 2 pages long
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005769274