Subastando la Energía Eléctrica para Clientes Regulados: Equilibrio con Información Completa y Aversión al Riesgo

This paper studies the non-cooperative equilibrium of an electricity auction in which bidding firms are risk averse and have complete information. It assumes a centralized dispatch and stochastic hydraulic generation. We find that the auction allocates th

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Caravia, Francisco ; Saavedra, Eduardo
Published in:	Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía. - Instituto de Economía, ISSN 0717-6821. - Vol. 44.2007, 129, p. 1-1
Publisher:	Instituto de Economía
Subject:	Subastas \| energía eléctrica \| aversión al riesgo \| oferta incierta \| racionamiento eléctrico

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	Spanish
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; L94 - Electric Utilities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730126