Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem
Year of publication: |
July 2009
|
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Authors: | Aghion, Philippe |
Other Persons: | Fudenberg, Drew (contributor) ; Holden, Richard T. (contributor) |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Cambridge, Mass : National Bureau of Economic Research |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Series: | NBER working paper series ; no. w15167 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Mode of access: World Wide Web System requirements: Adobe [Acrobat] Reader required for PDF files Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers. |
Other identifiers: | 10.3386/w15167 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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