Subjective expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery
We develop a model of general equilibrium with trade ex ante in a context of private and incomplete state verification. Instead of choosing bundles, agents choose lists of bundles out of which the market then selects one bundle for delivery. With agents having subjective expectations about the bundle that will be delivered, we study existence of a subjective expectations equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Correia-da-Silva, João ; Hervés-Beloso, Carlos |
Published in: |
Journal of Mathematical Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068. - Vol. 44.2008, 7-8, p. 641-650
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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