Successive Monopolies and Regulation in a Spatial Model

A government authority regulates an upstream monopolist only if there is a sufficient welfare increase to justify doing so. A downstream firm strategically increases costs in order to force regulation upstream. The decision to regulate increases profit downstream, reduces profit upstream and reduces welfare relative to a model with no possibility for welfare-enhancing regulation

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Heywood, John S. ; Pal, Debashis
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Monopol \| Monopoly \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Räumlicher Wettbewerb \| Spatial competition

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Manchester School, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 167-178, March 2004
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072922