Sufficient conditions for unique stable sets in three agent pillage games
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Rowat, Colin ; Kerber, Manfred |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 69.2014, p. 69-80
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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