Super-Majorites, One-Dimensional Policies, and Social Surplus

In the setting of a one-dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent-shaped. When the utilities are strictly concave, the surplus maximizing rule is a strict supermajority.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	CARDONA, DANIEL ; PONSATÍ, CLARA
Published in:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 16.2014, 6, p. 884-898
Publisher:	Association for Public Economic Theory - APET

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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