Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility
Year of publication: |
2002-11-01
|
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Authors: | Bo, Ernesto Dal |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Oxford University |
Subject: | supermajorities | committees | commitment versus flexibility | voting | endogenous institutions | endogenous constitutions |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 132 |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government |
Source: |
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