Supranational rules, national discretion : increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital?
Year of publication: |
[2020] ; This version: November 15, 2020
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Authors: | Gropp, Reint ; Mosk, Thomas ; Ongena, Steven ; Simac, Ines ; Wix, Carlo |
Publisher: |
Frankfurt am Main : Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Basler Akkord | Basel Accord | Inflation | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | EU-Staaten | EU countries |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | SAFE working paper. - Frankfurt am Main : SAFE, ZDB-ID 2745463-0. - Vol. no. 296 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3736781 [DOI] hdl:10419/227743 [Handle] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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