Surenchères salariales et conflictualité : une approche expérimentale

Based on a non cooperative model with asymmetric information tested by means of a laboratory experiment, this paper examines the influence of a negotiation outcome on the demand behavior in subsequent negotiations. While the assumption of inflationary wage claims is rejected by the data, a better information of the bargaining parties reveals to be insufficient to decrease the risk of conflict. Classification JEL : C78, J51, J52

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Tournadre, Fabienne ; Villeval, Marie-Claire
Published in:	Revue d'économie politique. - Dalloz. - Vol. 112.2002, 1, p. 157-171
Publisher:	Dalloz
Subject:	bargaining \| asymmetric information \| experiments

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives Structure, and Effects ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187186