Sustainable agreements on stochastic river flow
Year of publication: |
May 2016
|
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Authors: | Ansink, Erik ; Houba, Harold |
Published in: |
Resource and energy economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0928-7655, ZDB-ID 1153616-0. - Vol. 44.2016, p. 92-117
|
Subject: | River sharing | Sustainable agreements | Repeated sequential game | Folk Theorem | Water allocation | Renegotiation-proofness | Wasserversorgung | Water supply | Nachhaltige Entwicklung | Sustainable development | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Umweltabkommen | International environmental agreement | Wasserpolitik | Water policy | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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