Sustainable collusion on separate markets
In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Belleflamme, Paul ; Bloch, Francis |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 99.2008, 2, p. 384-386
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Sustainable collusion on separate markets
Belleflamme, Paul, (2006)
-
Dynamic protection of innovations through patents and trade secrets
Belleflamme, Paul, (2013)
-
Sustainable collusion on separate markets
Belleflamme, Paul, (2008)
- More ...