Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure
Firms often augment career concerns incentives with implicit incentive contracts. I formalize the interaction between these two incentives, and highlight its implications on a firm's decision to disclose its workers' productivity information. Disclosure enhances career concerns but inhibits implicit contracts. I show two main results. First, implicit contracts weaken (i.e., substitute) career concerns if the prior belief about the worker's ability is low, and vice versa. Second, when these incentives are substitutes, the optimal disclosure policy follows a cutoff rule: patient firms are opaque, and transparent firms never offer implicit contracts. These results need not hold if the incentives are complements. Copyright (c) 2008, RAND.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Mukherjee, Arijit |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - RAND, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 39.2008, 2, p. 469-490
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Publisher: |
RAND |
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