Symmetric equilibria in a cost-averting war of attrition requiring minimum necessary conceders
Year of publication: |
Jan 2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Geofferey Jiyun ; Kim, Bara |
Published in: |
The B.E. journal of theoretical economics. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1935-1704, ZDB-ID 2268339-2. - Vol. 18.2018, 1, p. 1-9
|
Subject: | Bellman equation | Nash equilibrium | public economics | trembling hand perfection | war of attrition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht |
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