Symmetric Ignorance : The Cost of Anonymous Lemons

Rules that restrict information required in negotiated private transactions have spurred a vast increase in the scope of anonymous financial markets, particularly in the US. The subtle costs of the information restricting rules raise questions about the social value of “completing” anonymous markets that would not naturally survive and did not historically exist

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2020]
Authors:	Bhide, Amar
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Soziale Kosten \| Social costs

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: European Financial Managment Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 18, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3439105 [DOI]
Classification:	G10 - General Financial Markets. General ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation ; K22 - Corporation and Securities Law ; N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352336